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Abstract
The paper develops a short-run model of a small open financially repressed
economy characterized by unorganized money markets, capital good imports, capital mobility, wage indexation, and flexible exchange rates. The analysis shows
that financial liberalization, in the form of an increased rate of interest on deposits
and tight monetary policy, unambiguously and unconditionally causes deflation.
Moreover, the results do not depend on the degree of capital mobility and structure
of wage setting. The paper recommends that a small open developing economy
should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy if reducing inflation is
a priority. The pre-requisite for such a policy, however, requires the establishment
of a flexible exchange rate regime.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E31, E44, E52, F41.
Keywords: Financial Liberalization; Inflation; Small open economy.

This is a revised version of a paper that was written as a part of my coursework
in Monetary Theory and Policy at the University of Connecticut. I am particularly
grateful to Professor Stephen M. Miller for many helpful comments.

I. INTRODUCTION
Using a modified Mundell-Fleming model that accounts for financial repression,
the paper analyzes the effects of financial liberalization on inflation. Specifically,
financial restriction consists of three elements. First, the banking system receives
favorable treatment and protection because the government can finance the budget
deficit at a low or zero cost. The government does so forcing the banks to hold
government bonds and money through the imposition of “high” multiple reserve
requirements. Second, since government cannot easily extract revenue from private
securities, it does not promote the development of private bond and equity markets.
Finally, interest rate ceilings exist in the banking system to encourage low-cost
investment and curtail competition with public sector fund raising from the private
sector. In this context, financial liberalization means a relaxation of the interest rate
ceiling and lowering of reserve requirements.
The paper receives motivation from a recent theoretical contribution by Nag and
Mukhopadhyay (1998). The authors show that the new-structuralist claim,
propagated by Wijnbergen (1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986), of a tight monetary
policy and interest rate deregulation, does not hold with import penetration and a
flexible exchange rate. The stagflationary outcome of the new-structuralist thesis
does not prove obvious. Our paper builds on Nag and Mukhopadhyay (1998), by
incorporating capital account mobility along with perfect wage indexation and
2

capital good imports, to show that a higher interest rate on deposits and tighter
monetary policy will always prove unconditionally deflationary. Moreover, this
result holds irrespective of the degree of capital mobility and whether the real
product wage is fixed or not. Our paper compliments and extends Nag and
Mukhopadhyay (1998).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic environment
and Section 3 solves the model and discusses the effects of financial liberalization
on the rate of inflation. Section 4 concludes.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a small open economy, operating under a floating exchange rate
regime, with one domestically produced good and two different types of imported
goods -- a consumption good and a capital good. The imported capital good
combineswith the domestic component to produce the final capital good. We
assume that the shares of the domestically produced component and the imported
capital good in investment are exogenous. The imported consumption good also
account for a fixed share of total consumption expenditure and depends solely on
income. The price of the domestic good is endogenous, whilst the prices of the
imported goods, both consumption and capital, are exogenous. We assume a
perfectly elastic supply function of the importable goods at a foreign currency
price of P*. Since P* is parametrically given to the economy, we set it to unity for
3

simplicity. Note that we implicitly assume a linear the production transformation
schedule for the imported consumption good and the capital good. Thus, the same
technology applies to both capital formation and the production of consumption
goods in the world market and, hence, both investment and consumption goods sell
for the same price of P*.
“Financial repression” proves severe enough to give rise to an Unofficial Money
Market (UMM), or the “curb” markets. The curb market establishes an informal
credit market, where moneylenders and indigenous banks intermediate between
savers and borrowers, beyond the regulation of the monetary authority. Because of
no reserve requirements, the curb market resembles a competitive and agile credit
market, providing more efficient intermediation than the official banking system.
Moreover, since the banking system operates under interest rate regulations and
high reserve requirements, the curb market emerges as a residual market that
absorbs the excess demand for credit from the official banking system.
Firms unable to obtain low cost funds from the banking system at the regulated
lending rate turn to the UMM to satisfy their borrowing needs to finance working
and physical capital (the domestic and imported component) requirements. The
freely determined rate in the curb market significantly exceeds the deposit and loan
rates in the official banking system, and reflects the true marginal cost of
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production. Hence, the UMM rate of interest appears as an argument in both the
aggregate demand and supply sides of the model.
Our model of the small open financially repressed economy modifies the standard
Mundell-Fleming model as outlined in Argy (1994). The basic structure of the
economy involves four interrelated markets, labor, commodity, money, and foreign
exchange markets. We start off with the labor market. Unlike the standard
Mundell-Fleming model, the aggregate supply curve slopes upward under
reasonable assumptions about wage-price flexibility.
As a short-run model, the aggregate supply depends solely on conditions in the
labor market. That is,

ln Q s = − β [(lnW − ln P ) + rc ] .
1
d

(1)

Equation (1) states that the quantity supplied negatively relates to the marginal cost
of hiring one additional unit of labor. Note that labor represents the working capital
requirements of the firm, which requires loan financing. Hence, besides the real
wage (lnW-lnP), the real interest rate of the curb market (rc) also appears in the
equation. We assume that the nominal wage (W) gets fully indexed to the
consumer price index (P) (i.e., W=P), where the consumer price index (CPI) equals
the weighted average of the price of home good (Pd ) and the price of imported
good (eP*). Since P* equals unity, the movements in the price of the imported good
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completely reflect variations in the nominal exchange rate, e. So the following
relationship holds:
ln P = β 2 ln Pd + (1− β 2 )ln e .

(2)

Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and introducing time generates the
aggregate supply equation as follows:
ln Qt s = − β1[(1− β 2 )(ln et − ln Pd t )] - β1 rct,

(3)

where βi ’s > 0, i =1, 2.
Next, we turn our attention to the commodity market. The aggregate demand
positively relates to the level of government expenditure G, exogenous foreign
output Yf, and the real exchange rate (lne-lnPd). While the real interest rate in the
curb market (rc) negatively influences the domestic investment demand and, hence,
the aggregate demand. We postulate an IS curve of the following nature:

ln Qtd = α1(ln et − ln Pd t ) + α 2 ln Gt −α3rct + α 4 ln Y f t ,

(4)

where αi ’s > 0, i= 1, 2, 3, 4.
To incorporate the role of reserve requirements, we endogenize the supply of
money. The money demand equation follows the standard liquidity-preference
theory. Given this, the nominal demand for money function is defined as follows:
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ln M td = ln Pdt + δ1 ln Yt + δ 2idt − δ 3ict ,

(5)

where M td , Yt , idt , and ict equal, respectively, the nominal money demand, the real
gross domestic product, the nominal interest rate on deposits, and the nominal
interest rate on curb market loans. Note that δ i ’s > 0, i=1,2,3. Following the newstructuralist argument, we assume that a rise in the bank deposit (UMM rate of
interest) rate causes a reallocation in households’ portfolios toward bank deposits
(UMM securities) at the expense of UMM securities (bank deposits) and not cash,
thus, causing money demand to increase (decrease). This assumption makes good
sense for a developing world, especially where most goods require cash payment
and, hence, the demand for currency remains relatively inelastic in relation to
changes in the opportunity cost variables.
Money supply equals the sum of currency in circulation (C) and supply of bank
deposits (D). We can write, (Ms )/R= (C/D)(D/R)+D/R, where R equals required
reserves and Ms equals the nominal supply of money. Alternatively,
Ms=((1+cu)/q)R, where cu equals the currency-deposit ratio and q equals the
required-reserve ratio. We assume that banks hold no excess reserves.
Simple intuition suggests that the currency-deposit ratio depends negatively on Y,
and id , and positively on ic. The rationale for the sign of the currency-deposit ratio
with respect to the interest rates reflects the fact that currency demand responds
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inelasticly to interest rate movements. As Y increases, however, both C and D rise.
But, assuming that the growth of banking habits means more payments through
banks, deposits increase more quickly than currency. Hence, the currency-deposit
ratio negatively correlates with the level of income. Using these arguments and
given that Ms=((1+cu)/q)R, the money supply function in log-terms conforms to
the following relation:
ln M ts = −η1 ln Yt −η2idt +η3ict + ln Rt − qt ,

(6)

where ηi ’s >0, i= 1, 2, 3. Combining equations (5) and (6) and realizing that the
nominal interest rate equals the sum of the real component and the expected rate of
inflation, treated as exogenous, we generate the following equation from the
money market equilibrium:
ln Rt = ln Pdt + ln qt −α5π e + α 6 ln Yt −α 7 rct + α8idt ,

(7)

where αi ’s > 0, i= 5, 6, 7, 8. Note that α5 = α 7 ,α 6 = η1 + δ1,α 7 = η3 + δ 3 ,α8 = η2 + δ 2 .
Nag and Mukhopadhyay (1998) and Nag (2000) argue that with significant
dependence of developing countries on imports of intermediate inputs and lack of
growth of exports due to structural bottlenecks, it proves difficult to maintain a
fixed exchange rate regime. The tremendous pressure on the balance of payments
in an open economic environment inevitably leads to the adoption of flexible
exchange rates. In this paper, we assume that the monetary authority allows the
8

exchange rate to float freely. Accordingly, the equilibrium in the foreign exchange
market equals the following:
Bt / X 0 = α9 (ln et − ln Pdt ) − ln Yt + ln Y ft + α10 rct + α11(rct − rt* ) ,

(8)

where αi ’s > 0, i= 9, 10, 11, with α9 > α1 and rt* equals the world rate of interest.
Note that α11 captures the degree of capital mobility, which can range between zero
to infinity of from no to perfect capital mobility, respectively. Any positive
intermediate value reflects imperfect capital mobility. Equation (8) defines the
overall balance of payments given initial exports (X0), where the first four terms
determines the current account balance. The current account depends on the
interest rate in the curb market, because of the import of capital goods. The last
term captures the capital account balance. Equilibrium in the foreign exchange
market implies that the balance of payments (BP) = 0.
III. SOLUTION AND FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
The section solves the model and then analyzes the effects of interest rate
deregulation and lower reserve requirements on inflation and output. Equations (4),
(7), and (8) constitute the IS, LM, and BP curves, and along with (3) can solve for
Y, rc, Pd, and e, realizing that Qd = Qs = Y.
Using equations (4), (7), and (8), we derive the following equation for the
aggregate demand (AD) curve:
9

ln Qtd = Ω1 ln Pdt + Ω2 ln Y ft + Ω3idt + Ω4rt* + Ω5π te
+ Ω6 qt + Ω7 ln Rt + Ω8 ln Gt

,

(9)

where

Ω1 = −[α3α9 + α1(α10 + α11)]/ Θ < 0,
Ω2 = [α 7 (α 4α9 − α1)]/ Θ ?,
Ω3 = −α8[α3α9 + α1(α10 + α11)]/ Θ < 0,
Ω4 = [α1α 7α11]/ Θ > 0,
Ω5 = α5[α3α9 + α1(α10 + α11)]/ Θ > 0,
Ω6 = −[α3α9 + α1(α10 + α11)]/ Θ < 0,
Ω7 = [α3α9 + α1(α10 + α11)]/ Θ > 0,
Ω8 = α 7α 2α9 / Θ > 0, and
Θ = [α3α 6α9 + α 7 (α9 − α1) + α1α 6 (α10 + α11)] > 0.
Given that α9 > α1 , the signs of the coefficient indicate that the slope and the shifts
of the aggregate demand curve conform to intuition.
Using equations (7) and (8), we solve for ln et and substitute the resulting solution
into equation (3). Thus, the aggregate supply (AS) curve emerges as follows:

ln Qts = Ψ1 ln Pdt + Ψ 2 ln Y ft + Ψ3idt + Ψ 4rt* + Ψ 5π te
+ Ψ 6qt + Ψ 7 ln Rt + Ψ8 ln Gt

,

(10)

where
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Ψ1 = β1[(1− β2 )(α3 + α11 + α10 ) − (α9 − α1)]/ Θ > 0,
Ψ 2 = −β1[α 6 (α1 − α 4α9 ) + (1− β 2 ){α 6 (α3 + α 4 (α11 + α10 )) + α 7 (1− α 4 )}]/ Θ ?,
Ψ3 = β1α8[(1− β2 )(α3 + α11 + α10 ) − (α9 − α1)]/ Θ > 0,
Ψ 4 = −β1α11[(1− β2 )(α3α 6 + α 7 ) + α1α 6 )]/ Θ < 0,
Ψ5 = −β1α5[(1− β2 )(α3 + α11 + α10 ) − (α9 − α1)]/ Θ < 0,
Ψ 6 = β1[(1− β2 )(α3 + α11 + α10 ) − (α9 − α1)]/ Θ > 0,
Ψ 7 = −β1[(1− β2 )(α3 + α11 + α10 ) − (α9 − α1)]/ Θ < 0, and
Ψ8 = β1[(1− β2 )[α 2{α 6 (α11 + α10 ) − α 7}]) − α 2α 6α9 ]/ Θ ?.
To ensure that the aggregate supply curve slopes positively (the standard case), we
impose the condition that (1− β 2 )(α3 +α11 +α10 ) − (α9 −α1) > 0, which also helps
to sign Ψi , i= 3, 5, 6 and 7. This condition likely holds for a higher degree of
capital mobility, given by α11 , and is obvious when α11 tends to infinity. Lower
capital mobility can imply that the aggregate supply curve slopes negatively (the
non-standard case). To maintain stability in such a case, however, we must ensure
that the aggregate supply curve though negatively sloped must exhibit a steeper
slope than the aggregate demand curve (i.e., | Ω1 |>| Ψ1 | ). In the non-standard case,
except for Ψi , i= 3, 5, 6 and 7, the signs of all the other coefficients of the

aggregate supply curve do not change from the standard case. Understandably, Ψi ,
i= 3, 6, and 7, in the non-standard case possess signs opposite to that in the

standard case.
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Using equations (9) and (10), we derive the solutions for output and the price level
as follows:
ln Yt = Ξ1 ln Y ft + Ξ 2 rt* + Ξ3 ln Gt and

(11)

ln Pdt = Λ1 ln Y ft + Λ 2idt + Λ3rt* + Λ 4π te + Λ5qt + Λ 6 ln Rt + Λ7 ln Gt ,

(12)

where in the standard (non-standard) case,
Ξ1 = (Ω2 Ψ1 − Ψ 2Ω1) /(Ψ1 − Ω1 )?(?), Ξ 2 = (Ω4Ψ1 − Ψ 4Ω1 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1 )?(< 0),
Ξ3 = (Ω8Ψ1 − Ψ8Ω1 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1 )?(?),

and, in both the standard and the non-standard (given, | Ω1 |>| Ψ1 | ) cases,:
Λ1 = (Ω2 − Ψ 2 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1)?, Λ 2 = (Ω3 − Ψ 3 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1 ) = −α8 < 0,
Λ3 = (Ω4 − Ψ 4 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1 ) > 0, Λ 4 = (Ω5 − Ψ 5 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1) = α5 > 0,
Λ5 = (Ω6 − Ψ 6 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1) = −1 < 0, Λ 6 = (Ω7 − Ψ 7 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1) = 1 > 0,
Λ7 = (Ω8 − Ψ8 ) /(Ψ1 − Ω1)?.

and

Interestingly, the solution for output does not depend on the monetary policy
parameter and inflation expectations. Moreover, effect on output corresponding to
a fiscal policy change proves ambiguous, since the effect on the aggregate supply
curve is uncertain. Besides, we observe that the coefficients on the monetary
policy parameters and inflation expectations do not depend on the degree of capital
mobility, import elasticities, and aggregate supply curve parameters.
Next, we investigate the effects of deregulation of the interest rate ceiling on
deposits (i.e., an increase in i ) and also lower reserve requirements (qt) on rate of
dt
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inflation (gPdt), for both the standard and the non-standard case. A ‘g’ before a
variable indicates the growth rate, while a ∆ preceding the variable, indicates a
change in the variable concerned. To derive the reduced-form equation for the rate
of inflation we first difference equation (12).
( gPdt ) = Λ1( gY ft ) + Λ 2∆idt + Λ3∆rt* + Λ 4∆π te + Λ5∆qt + Λ 6 ( gRt ) + Λ 7 ( gGt ). (13)
From equation (12), we can make the following observations:
(a) Interest rate deregulation unambiguously reduces inflation, and
(b) A lower reserve requirement policy generates inflation.
An increase in the controlled rate of interest on deposit increases the demand for
money and, hence, the rate of interest in the curb market must increase to clear the
money market. This enhances the cost of the domestic investment and shifts the IS
curve to the left and reduces real gross domestic product and, hence, the import of
the consumption good. At the same time, the increase in the UMM rate of interest
reduces the import of the capital good and causes a capital inflow. The resulting
surplus causes the nominal exchange rate to fall and shifts the IS curve further to
the left and the BP curve up, reducing output further. This causes the aggregate
demand curve to shift to the left, at a given price level.
On the supply side, the increase in the UMM rate of interest shifts the AS curve up
due to the cost-push effect, but the decline in the nominal exchange rate reduces
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the marginal cost of production. The positive effect on the aggregate supply curve
due to the exchange rate appreciation outweighs the negative effect due to the
increase in the UMM rate of interest, causing the aggregate supply curve to shift to
the right. The leftward shift of the AD curve and the rightward shift of the AS
curve ensures a deflation.
Such a policy change, however, fails to exert any real effect on output. Intuitively,
the following sequence of events neutralizes the effects of any monetary policy on
output: As the price level falls, the real exchange rate increases and shifts the IS,
BP, and LM curves to the right, such that in the end all the curves return to their
original positions. With real exchange rate and real interest rate unchanged, none
of the schedules move any further.
A reduction in the reserve requirement implies a loose monetary policy and the
curb market rate of interest must fall to ensure the money market equilibrium.
Henceforth, the analysis follows exactly the opposite path to the one discussed
above corresponding to an increase in the controlled interest rate on deposits. The
aggregate demand curve shifts to the right while the aggregate supply curve shifts
to the left causing inflation but, as before, no real effects.
For the non-standard case, given that | Ω1 |>| Ψ1 | , all coefficients in equation (13)
exhibit the same sign as the standard case. The effect on the aggregate demand
curve, corresponding to changes in the policy variable, matches the standard case.
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The aggregate supply curve, however, moves in the opposite direction to that
discussed above. The cost-push effect of the interest rate dominates the
employment and output effects corresponding to exchange rate changes.
The increase in the controlled rate of interest causes the AS curve to shift to the
left. With the aggregate demand curve shifting left as well, the price level falls, as
the latter shift tends to outweigh the former. Moreover, just as in the standard case,
relaxation of the reserve requirement causes inflation with no real effects. The
results occur because the coefficients of the monetary policy variables do not
depend on the slope parameters of the AS and AD curves.
In summary, the following results emerge: (i) Deregulation of interest rate on
deposits and a tight monetary policy (i.e., a rise in q or a fall in R) unambiguously
and unconditionally cause deflation; (ii) The effect on the GDP is, however,
neutral.
As a corollary, suppose that real product wage is fixed (i.e., β 2 = 1 ). Then, the
aggregate supply curve slopes negatively. For stability, we assume that | Ω1 |>| Ψ1 |
holds. Exactly the same results on the price level and output occur – a deflation
with no real effect from interest rate deregulation and tight monetary policy. The
coefficient of the monetary policy parameters in the reduced-form solution of the
rate of inflation do not depend on the supply curve elasticities with respect to real
wage and the curb market interest rate. As before, monetary policy is neutral. This
15

corollary proves important, especially in the light of the new-structuralist thesis of
stagflation. In Wijnbergen (1983), the real wage is fixed and the contractionary
effect of credit generates stagflation. Here, we show that even with a fixed real
wage, stagflation cannot occur.
IV. CONCLUSION AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
The paper modifies the standard Mundell-Fleming model and analyzes the effects
of financial liberalization on domestic inflation and GDP. Considering a small
open financially repressed economy characterized by an unofficial money market,
perfect wage indexation, capital good imports, and capital mobility, we show that
interest rate deregulation reduces inflation with no effect on the output. The result
sharply contrasts with the new-structuralist claim of stagflation following interest
rate deregulation, once we allow for exchange rate flexibility. Tight monetary
policy produces similar effects on inflation and real GDP. The results do not
depend on whether high or low capital mobility and whether a fixed or variable
real wage exist. The critical requirement is a flexible exchange rate regime.
The model makes the following recommendations. A small open developing
economy should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy, if reducing
inflation is a priority. To achieve this goal, however, the economy must establish a
flexible exchange rate regime. The degree of capital mobility and the wagestructure do not matter.
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To extend the current analysis, we could endogenize the process of expectation
formulation along the lines of rational expectation, and analyze whether such a
change affects our existing results. Further, since the current model does not
include any microfoundations, it could prove interesting to analyze the long-run
effects of financial liberalization on growth and inflation in a dynamic general
equilibrium model.
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